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In 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada decided only one case 
concerning the content of the principles of fundamental justice under 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1: In R. v. 
Khawaja,2 the Court rejected the appellant Nadarajah’s argument that the 
offence of participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist 
group (Criminal Code,3 section 83.18) violated section 7 of the Charter. 
The Court’s reasons for rejecting this argument illustrate two general 
trends of Charter jurisprudence in criminal law, particularly anti-
terrorism law. First, rather than invalidating offence definitions or 
statutory changes to criminal procedure, the Court prefers to use statutory 
interpretation to control the scope of criminal liability and to ensure fair 
proceedings. Second, the Court is reluctant to recognize new principles 
                                                                                                             
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to Kent Roach, 
Jamie Cameron and an anonymous reviewer for comments on a draft of this paper, to Andrew Hotke 
for research assistance, and to Jamie Cameron and Benjamin Berger for the invitation to participate 
in the 2012 Constitutional Cases conference at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”]; United 
States of America v. Sriskandarajah, [2012] S.C.J. No. 70, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). The 
arguments I consider in this paper were raised in Sriskandarajah by the appellant Nadarajah, but the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons for rejecting them were incorporated into its reasons in 
Khawaja. I will refer to them as “Nadarajah’s arguments”. In 2012, the Court did decide other cases 
concerning s. 7 of the Charter, but all of them involved the application of well-established principles 
of procedural fairness such as the right to a fair trial rather than proposed new principles of 
fundamental justice. See R. v. Bellusci, [2012] S.C.J. No. 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509 (S.C.C.); R. v. S. 
(N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.); R. v. Yumnu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 73, [2012] 
3 S.C.R. 777 (S.C.C.); R. v. Davey, [2012] S.C.J. No. 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 (S.C.C.). 
3  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”]. 
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of fundamental justice, particularly those relating to substantive criminal 
law. Since the earliest days of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has made section 7 into a powerful guarantee of substantive justice and 
procedural fairness, particularly in criminal law;4 but cases like Khawaja 
suggest that the development of the principles of fundamental justice 
may have reached its limit.5 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE “PARTICIPATING OR  
CONTRIBUTING” OFFENCE 
Section 83.18 of the Code creates the following offence: 
83.18(1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, 
directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of 
enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a 
terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment or a term not exceeding ten years. 
Section 83.18(2) provides that the offence can be committed 
(a) whether or not a terrorist activity is actually facilitated or carried out, 
(b) “whether or not … the participation or contribution of the accused 
actually enhance[d] the ability of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry 
out a terrorist activity” and whether or not the accused knew of “the 
specific nature of any terrorist activity”. Section 83.18(3) provides a non-
exhaustive list of activities that amount to participation or contribution, 
and section 83.18(4) provides some aspects of the accused’s conduct that 
may be considered in deciding whether he or she participates or 
contributes. “Terrorist activity” is defined in section 83.01.6  
Before considering the constitutionality of section 83.18, the Court 
interprets it. The purpose of the offence, the Court holds, 
... is “to provide means by which terrorism may be prosecuted and 
prevented” … — not to punish individuals for innocent, socially useful 
                                                                                                             
4  See generally Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 
[hereinafter “Stewart”]. 
5  Other relatively recent cases where the Court has refused to recognize new principles of 
fundamental justice include R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) 
and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation”]. 
6  This definition was held to be constitutionally valid in Khawaja, supra, note 2. 
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or casual acts which, absent any intent, indirectly contribute to a 
terrorist activity.7 
In light of this purpose, the Court considers two elements of the 
offence that turn out to be critical both to its meaning and scope and 
therefore to its constitutionality. First, the Court notes that the Crown 
must prove a very high level of mens rea. Section 83.18(1) explicitly 
states not just that the accused must “knowingly” participate in or 
contribute to the activity of a terrorist group, but also that he or she must 
do so “for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to 
facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”.8 Thus, in contrast to most 
offences where proof of intention in the sense of knowledge of the effects 
of one’s actions is sufficient mens rea,9 here the Crown must prove not 
only that kind of knowledge but also a purpose. What exactly is the 
purpose element, in this context? The Court speaks of a “specific intent 
to enhance the abilities of a terrorist group”,10 and of an “intent to 
enhance the abilities of a terrorist group”.11 By way of contrast, the Court 
also notes that knowledge that one’s conduct will enable a group to 
pursue its activities coupled with “a valid reason” for interacting with the 
terrorist group would mean that a person was not guilty of the offence 
because the “valid reason” would negate the guilty purpose.12 The 
                                                                                                             
7  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 44, original emphasis, quoting from Re Application 
under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Re Application under s. 83.28”]. See also Khawaja, at para. 55. 
8  Khawaja, id., at para. 45. 
9  See, for example, R. v. Buzzanga, [1979] O.J. No. 4345, 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. C.A.) 
(interpreting the requirement that the accused “wilfully” promote hatred to require proof that the 
accused knew that their actions would have the effect of promoting hatred, not that they desired to 
promote hatred); R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J. No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.) (interpreting the 
word “purpose” in s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code as requiring only proof of knowledge of 
consequences). See also the American federal “material support” offences: 18 U.S.C.A., §§2339A, 
2339B. The offence in §2339A does require proof of knowledge that support is being provided and 
knowledge or intent that the support will be used “in preparation for, or in carrying out” terrorist 
acts. However, the offence in §2339B requires only proof of knowledge that the organization 
supported is in some way a terrorist group; there is no requirement that the prosecution prove any 
further purpose or ulterior intent. See, for example, United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 
2009); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), slip opinion, at 10-12 
[hereinafter “Holder”]. 
10  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 47; see also para. 57. 
11  Id., at para. 53. 
12  Id., at para. 47. In the same paragraph, the Court unhelpfully contrasts subjective mental 
states with lack of knowledge and negligence; while the Court is quite right to say that the mental 
elements of this offence are subjective and not objective, the real issue is what kind of subjective 
mental state is required.  
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Court’s overall conclusion on this point tracks an argument made some 
years ago by Kent Roach, that the Crown must prove not only the 
accused’s “guilty knowledge” of the effects of his or her conduct but also 
the “higher subjective purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist 
group to carry out a terrorist activity”.13 
Second, the Court interprets the actus reus of the offence as requiring 
proof that the accused’s conduct is “capable of materially enhancing the 
abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”, 
or, put another way, that the effect of the accused’s conduct on the 
group’s abilities “creates a risk of harm that rises beyond a de minimis 
threshold”.14 This aspect of the actus reus is to be assessed on a reason-
able person standard: whether a reasonable person would view the 
conduct “as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist 
group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”.15 
Putting these two points together with some less contentious aspects 
of the offence, we may conclude that the section 83.18 offence, as inter-
preted in Khawaja, requires proof of the following elements: 
• the accused participated in or contributed to any activity of a terrorist 
group; 
• the accused’s participation or contribution, viewed objectively, mate-
rially enhanced the abilities of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry 
out a terrorist activity; 
• the accused was aware of the general nature of the activity that he or 
she participated in or contributed to; 
• the accused knew that the group was a terrorist group;16 
                                                                                                             
13  Kent Roach, “Terrorism Offences and the Charter: A Comment on R. v. Khawaja” (2007) 
Can. Crim. L. Rev. 271, at 285. The Court quotes some of this passage: Khawaja, id., at para. 45. 
14  Id., at para. 51 (emphasis in original). 
15  Id. (emphasis in original); see also para. 52. Contrast the U.S. offences mentioned in note 
9 above. These offences are defined as providing “material support or resources”, but the statute 
itself provides an extensive definition of that term (18 U.S.C., §2339A(b)(1)). As a result, there is 
little scope for an argument that an accused is not guilty because his conduct has only a de minimis 
effect on a terrorist group’s capabilities.  
16  The Court in Khawaja, supra, note 2, does not discuss in detail the knowledge elements 
concerning the group and the nature of its activities, but at para. 41 the Court adopts the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s interpretation of these elements (see United States of America v. Sriskandarajah, 
[2010] O.J. No. 5474, 109 O.R. (3d) 680, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.)). 
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• the accused had the purpose, or specific intent, that the participation 
or contribution have the “general effect” of enhancing the terrorist 
group’s ability to carry out a terrorist activity. 
The Court’s interpretation of the mens rea, particularly of the purpose 
requirement, is entirely plausible and very much in accord with the 
interpretation offered by commentators around the time the anti-terrorism 
offences were enacted. The concern was that without significant mens rea 
requirements, the new anti-terrorism offences, including the definition of 
terrorism itself, would be vulnerable to constitutional challenge, 
particularly under the “stigma” doctrine that had resulted in the 
invalidation of the constructive murder provisions of the Code.17 The 
Court’s interpretation of section 83.18 makes it clear that the prosecution 
must prove significant subjective fault elements, which are surely more 
than adequate to justify stigmatizing an offender as a “terrorist”. 
Defining the actus reus of an offence with reference to the 
reasonable person is a common interpretive tool in Canadian criminal 
law. The Court has made the same move in deciding whether words 
spoken constitute a “threat” and whether an image of a child constitutes 
“child pornography”; for these offences, the question is whether the 
reasonable person would regard the words or the image as meeting the 
definition of the actus reus.18 So the Court’s use of that method here is 
unsurprising. But what is surprising is the Court’s apparent disregard for 
section 83.18(2)(b): 
An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not … 
the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhances the 
ability of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity. 
This paragraph is surely most plausibly read as stating that the effect 
of the accused’s conduct on the capabilities of the terrorist group is 
irrelevant, in other words that the accused’s contribution need not be 
“material”.19 Furthermore, section 83.18(3) defines certain specific forms 
                                                                                                             
17  Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 379-82; 
Stanley Cohen, “Safeguards in and Justifications for Canada’s New Anti-Terrorism Act” (2002-
2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 99. On the “stigma” doctrine, see Stewart, supra, note 4, at 166-85. 
18  R. v. McCraw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 69, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2 (S.C.C.). The Crown must, of course, also prove the mens rea, which for 
each of these offences is subjective. 
19  The Court in Khawaja, supra, note 2, mentions these provisions of s. 83.18(2)(b) 
at para. 41, but does not discuss or interpret them. Another possible reading of s. 83.18(2)(b), 
suggested to me by Andrew Hotke, is as follows. Suppose the Court is right to interpret s. 83.18(1) 
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of contributing or participating that do not on their face seem to require 
anything beyond the de minimis. For example, section 83.18(3)(d) 
specifies that one kind of participation or contribution is “entering or 
remaining in any country for the benefit of, at the direction of or in 
association with a terrorist group”.20 If the de minimis threshold applies to 
the conduct mentioned in section 83.18(3), then this provision must be 
read as requiring proof not only that the accused entered or remained, etc., 
with the appropriate mental state, but also that his entering or remaining in 
any country materially enhanced the ability of a terrorist group to pursue 
its objectives. Finally, the wording of section 83.18(1) itself suggests that 
although the accused’s purpose must be to enhance a terrorist group’s 
abilities, materially enhancing them is not part of the actus reus; it would 
seem that all that is required is conduct, regardless of whether its effect is 
beyond de minimis, with the relevant knowledge and purpose.  
Yet a statute that imposed criminal liability on the basis of conduct 
that was de minimis, that had essentially no effect on the world, would be 
close to imposing liability for thoughts (knowledge and motivation) 
alone and so might plausibly be characterized as overbroad.21 The Court’s 
willingness to overlook this plausible reading of section 83.18(2) and (3) 
in interpreting section 83.18(1) suggests that it prefers to interpret 
statutes so that they are not overbroad than to find them overbroad and 
then strike them down. Kent Roach has argued that this interpretive 
strategy is “less transparent and less democratic” than striking down 
“legislation that may clearly and unreasonably violate the Charter”.22 
Striking down, he suggests, puts in motion a process of dialogue between 
the Court and the legislature in which the arguments for and against limiting 
or overriding Charter rights can be clearly stated and democratically 
                                                                                                             
as requiring proof of contribution or participation outside the de minimis range. Then a potential 
terrorist who contributes or participates to an imaginary group set up by the police as part of an 
undercover investigation might say that his contribution, no matter now large it seemed to be, was de 
minimis because there was no contribution to the effectiveness of any actual terrorist group. 
Section 83.18(2)(b) might then be read as blocking this argument, so as to facilitate undercover 
investigation of suspected terrorists. The same result could be achieved with the law of attempts (see 
United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] S.C.J. No. 64, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dynar”]), but without s. 83.18(2)(b), a court might find it difficult to impose liability for an 
impossible attempt to commit an offence that is itself remote from the ultimate harm. 
20  Compare the concerns expressed about the draft version of s. 83.18 by Don Stuart, “The 
Dangers of Quick Fix Legislation in the Criminal Law” in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent 
Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 205, at 209-11. 
21  Although one might say the same about legally impossible attempts, where the Court has 
imposed liability: see Dynar, supra, note 19. 
22  Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 287-88. 
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debated. There is much to be said for Roach’s view in cases of obvious 
Charter violations, such as reverse onuses.23 But it is less obviously 
applicable to a statutory provision like section 83.18, which is open to 
being interpreted in a variety of ways; moreover, exercises in statutory 
interpretation can also give rise to dialogue between the Court and the 
legislature.24 An interpretive stance implicitly assuming that the 
legislature has not set out to violate constitutional rights may do as much 
or more for the substance of Charter rights as striking down, by 
deflecting the tendency of legislatures to respond with enactments that 
are minimally compliant with the Charter. 
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
The principles of fundamental justice invoked by Nadarajah were the 
norm against overbreadth and the norm against gross disproportionality. 
These are both substantive principles that apply whenever legislation or 
other government action affects the interests protected by section 7 of the 
Charter.25 The norm against overbreadth originated in Heywood.26 It states 
that a law offends the principles of fundamental justice if “in pursuing a 
legitimate objective, [it] uses means which are broader than is necessary to 
accomplish that objective”.27 The defect in an overbroad law is that the 
interests protected by section 7 — life, liberty and security of the person — 
are affected more than necessary for the purposes of the law. The norm 
against gross disproportionality seems to have originated in Suresh28 and 
                                                                                                             
23  The complex split decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, 
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.), upholding reverse onuses in the context of regulatory offences, was in 
this sense a missed opportunity for dialogue about constitutional status of the pre-Charter concept of 
a “strict liability” offence, as defined in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 
2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.). 
24  The new self-defence provisions in s. 34 of the Criminal Code might be read as a 
legislative response to the courts’ repeated complaints about the confusing and overlapping structure 
of the former provisions: see, for instance, R. v. McIntosh, [1995] S.C.J. No. 16, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Pintar, [1996] O.J. No. 3451, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 402 (Ont. C.A.). But the proper 
interpretation of the new provisions is far from obvious, so their ultimate impact on the law of self-
defence will depend on how the courts interpret them. 
25  They are related to but distinct from the norm against vague laws and the norm against 
arbitrary state action. All four of these norms demand that state action respect certain minimal 
requirements of rationality. See Stewart, supra, note 4, at 127-55.  
26  R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Heywood”]. 
27  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 37. 
28  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
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was more explicitly considered in Malmo-Levine.29 It states that a law 
offends the principles of fundamental justice if its impact on the interests 
protected by section 7 of the Charter is excessive in light of the objectives 
of the legislation.30 The defect in a grossly disproportionate law is that the 
damage to the interests protected by section 7 is so severe that it cannot be 
justified by the benefits to the legitimate objectives of the law. 
It is unclear from the cases whether gross disproportionality is a way 
of describing the defect of an overbroad law or whether overbreadth and 
gross disproportionality are distinct constitutional defects such that a law 
could be overbroad but not disproportionate, or vice versa.31 In Khawaja, 
the Crown urged the Court to adopt the former view. The Court, though 
declining to resolve the point explicitly, leans to the view that the two 
concepts are distinct: 
Overbreadth occurs when the means selected by the legislator are 
broader than necessary to achieve the state objective, and gross 
disproportionality occurs when state actions or legislative responses to 
a problem are “so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate 
government interest” …32 
On this reading, a penal law could be overbroad, but not dispropor-
tionate, if it prohibited more conduct than necessary to achieve its 
objective but was not so extreme in its effects on life, liberty and/or secu-
rity of the person as to be per se disproportionate to the objective. On the 
other hand, a law could be disproportionate, but not overbroad, if the 
prohibition was necessary to its objective, but the impact of that prohibi-
tion on life, liberty and/or security of the person was nevertheless so 
severe that prohibiting the conduct was, from a constitutional point of 
view, worse than using policy measures that would not affect life, liberty 
and security to deal with the conduct.33 
                                                                                                             
29  Malmo-Levine, supra, note 5. 
30  Id., at para. 169. 
31  The former view is suggested by some of the language in Heywood, supra, note 26 and in 
R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735 (S.C.C.); the latter view is suggested by the 
structure of the reasoning in PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”], where the two norms are considered 
separately. See also Khawaja, supra, note 2, paras. 38-39; Stewart, supra, note 4, at 151-55. 
32  Khawaja, id., at para. 40, quoting from PHS, id., at para. 133. 
33  This was the essence of the applicant’s unsuccessful argument in Malmo-Levine, supra, 
note 5. The applicant did not claim that prohibiting marijuana was an overbroad response to the 
problems caused by the use of marijuana; he argued, rather, that the impact of prohibition on the s. 7 
interests was out of proportion to any abatement of harm achieved by the prohibition. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) AT THE LIMITS OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 411 
The contrast between overbreadth and gross disproportionality is 
analogous to the difference between the second and third steps of the 
Oakes34 proportionality test. A limit on a Charter right fails the “minimal 
impairment” test if it is broader than reasonably necessary to achieve its 
pressing and substantial objective. A limit on a Charter right might pass 
that test, yet fail the “salutary and deleterious effects” test if “the impact 
of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the 
impugned law”.35 As I have argued elsewhere, the view that overbreadth 
and gross disproportionality are distinct constitutional defects is 
preferable. A law that overreaches but might be more carefully tailored to 
achieve its legislative objective can be amended without compromising 
that objective, but if the effects of a law on the interests protected by 
section 7 are so Draconian that it is per se disproportionate, then the 
legislature must in amending the law be prepared to accept some 
compromise of its objective.36 
1. Overbreadth 
Nadarajah argued that the section 83.18 offence was overbroad. In 
light of its interpretation of section 83.18, the Court rejected that argu-
ment. The material contribution and purpose elements were critical to 
this conclusion. Consider the following reasonable hypotheticals that 
were said to make the offence overbroad: 
• “a person … marches in a non-violent rally held by the charitable 
arm of a terrorist group, with the specific intention of lending credi-
bility to the group …”37. The Court holds that this person would not 
be guilty under section 83.18(1) because his or her conduct would 
not materially enhance the group’s ability to facilitate or carry out a 
terrorist activity.38 
                                                                                                             
34  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
35  Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567, at para. 76 (S.C.C.). Compare Arahon Barak, Proportionality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), at 344. 
36  Stewart, supra, note 4, 150-56. 
37  Khawaja, supra, note 2, para. 49. If the terrorist group in question was “foreign”, this 
conduct might well amount to “material support” under U.S.C.A., §2339B, because it would 
arguably be “advocacy performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist 
organization”: Holder, supra, note 9, slip opinion, at 19. 
38  Khawaja, id., at paras. 50-51. 
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• “a restaurant owner … cooks a single meal for a known terrorist”.39 
The Court holds that the restaurant owner would not be guilty because 
his or her conduct “is not of a nature to materially enhance the abilities 
of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity”.40 
• A lawyer defends a known terrorist on a terrorism-related charge.41 
The Court holds that the lawyer is not guilty, even if he or she knows 
that a successful defence will have the effect of enabling the client to 
continue to pursue terrorism, as long as the lawyer’s purpose is 
merely to do his or her job as a lawyer, that is, to provide his client 
with “a full defence at law”.42 
In each case, it is either the “beyond de minimis” element of the 
actus reus or the purpose element of the mens rea that saves the 
hypothetical accused from criminal liability, and therefore saves 
section 83.18 from overbreadth. The Court’s strict interpretation of the 
offence elements is critical to its finding that the offence is not overbroad.  
2.  Gross Disproportionality 
Nadarajah’s gross disproportionality argument was potentially far 
more significant than his overbreadth argument. If accepted, it would 
have amounted to constitutionalizing a controversial principle of substan-
tive criminal law: that conduct defined as an offence should not be too 
remote from the harm or wrong that the offence is intended to address. 
The Court’s reasons for rejecting it show its reluctance to accept the con-
stitutional status of that principle, and perhaps more generally its 
reluctance to recognize substantive principles of fundamental justice in 
the criminal law beyond those it has already accepted. 
The essence of Nadarajah’s gross disproportionality argument was that 
it was unconstitutional to criminalize conduct that falls short of recognized 
forms of inchoate liability. Attempting, conspiring, and counselling the 
commission of acts of terrorism can be readily prosecuted under 
                                                                                                             
39  Id., at para. 52; compare Kevin E. Davis, “Cutting Off the Flow of Funds to Terrorists: 
Whose Funds? Which Funds? Who Decides” in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, 
eds., The Security of Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 299, at 301-303 [hereinafter 
“Daniels, Macklem & Roach”]. 
40  Khawaja, id., at para. 52. 
41  Compare Kent Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law” in Daniels, 
Macklem & Roach, supra, note 39, at 161. 
42  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 47. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) AT THE LIMITS OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 413 
the Criminal Code, with or without section 83.18.43 But section 83.18 
criminalizes conduct that is even more remote from the actual commission 
of a terrorist offence, so remote from the commission of a terrorist act that 
it probably could not be prosecuted as attempting, conspiring, or 
counselling.44 It was, Nadarajah argued, “unnecessary and disproportionate 
to reach back further and criminalize activity that is preliminary or 
ancillary to those preparatory acts”.45 Or, as he put it in his factum: 
Parliament is entitled to broadly define the scope of conduct prohibited 
by its anti-terrorism legislation but only so far as it creates a risk of 
harm either because the conduct is inherently dangerous or is 
preliminary to other dangerous acts.46 
He noted that in Déry, the Court had held that “attempting to conspire” to 
commit a substantive offence was an offence unknown to Canadian law.47 
The Court rejected the disproportionality argument, for two reasons. 
First, Déry was not a constitutional case, and moreover was concerned 
with the remoteness of the accused’s conduct from a substantive offence 
(which in that case was theft). Under section 83.18, in contrast, “there is 
no problem of remoteness from a substantive offence because Parliament 
has defined the substantive offence … as acting in ways that enhance the 
ability of a terrorist group to carry out a terrorist activity”.48 Second, 
given the interpretation of section 83.18 as requiring proof of, among 
other elements, conduct “capable of materially enhancing the abilities of 
a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity” and a spe-
cific intent to that effect, section 83.18 is not disproportionate to the 
objective of preventing terrorism. Since a claim of disproportionality 
compares the impact of a law on the interests protected by section 7 with 
its impact on its objective, this holding might be spelled out as follows: 
the effect of the section in prohibiting conduct that was not previously 
criminal is not disproportionate to the benefits of preventing terrorism. 
As the Court put it: 
                                                                                                             
43  And with or without the facilitating offence in s. 83.19 of the Code, supra, note 3, for 
that matter. 
44  Though it likely includes those forms of participation. 
45  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 58. 
46  Nadarajah Factum, para. 45. For a similar argument, though not expressed in constitutional 
terms, see Peter Ramsay, “Preparation Offences, Security Interests, Political Freedom” in Antony 
Duff et al., eds., The Structures of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 203. 
47  R. v. Déry, [2006] S.C.J. No. 53, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 669 (S.C.C.); see also R. v. Dungey, 
[1979] O.J. No. 1146, 51 C.C.C. (2d) 86 (Ont. C.A.). 
48  Khawaja, supra, note 2, at para. 61. 
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It is true that s. 83.18 captures a wide range of conduct. However … the 
scope of that conduct is reduced by the requirement of specific intent 
and the exclusion of conduct that a reasonable person would not view 
as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to 
facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity. On the other side of the scale 
lies the objective of preventing the devastating harm that may result 
from terrorist activity.49 
Once again, the Court’s relatively narrow interpretation of the offence is 
critical to its holding that the offence is constitutionally valid. 
The Court’s observation that Déry and related cases were not consti-
tutional cases may seem to beg the question: Nadarajah did not argue that 
they were constitutional, but that the principles they expressed ought to 
be recognized as constitutional. And that is typically how the principles 
of fundamental justice develop: the Court gives constitutional status to 
legal ideas that have previously been expressed as common law princi-
ples or as norms of statutory interpretation.50 Moreover, the Court has 
previously recognized a number of substantive criminal law doctrines as 
principles of fundamental justice that serve to control the scope of crimi-
nal liability.51 The Court’s resistance to recognizing new principles of 
fundamental justice of this kind, such as the harm principle,52 raises the 
disquieting possibility that a legislature can, with appropriate mens rea, 
make virtually any conduct into a substantive offence.  
Nevertheless, the Court was wise to resist the particular argument 
that Nadarajah made. It would have effectively constitutionalized a 
principle of substantive criminal law concerning the proper scope of 
criminal liability; it would have created a new constitutional norm 
against criminalizing conduct that is in some sense too remote from the 
wrong or harm that the offence is intended to prevent. It would then have 
been necessary to define a conception of remoteness appropriate to this 
norm. That conception of remoteness would likely be defined on one end 
by the core wrongs and harms targeted by the criminal law, and on the 
other end by the traditional varieties of party and inchoate liability (most 
significantly, aiding and abetting, counselling, attempting and 
conspiring). If the conduct in question could not be characterized as 
wrongful or sufficiently harmful in its own right, or could not be 
                                                                                                             
49  Id., at para. 62. 
50  See Stewart, supra, note 4, c. 3. 
51  Id., c. 4C and 4D. 
52  See Malmo-Levine, supra, note 5. 
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prosecuted under the existing provisions of the Code governing party 
liability and inchoate liability, it could not be criminalized. And this 
principle would have significantly restricted the ability of Canadian 
legislatures to create penal law and would cast into doubt the 
constitutional validity of many existing offences. It would, for example, 
put in question the constitutionality of much of Part III of the Code, 
which consists mostly of penal apparatus for the enforcement of the 
regulatory regime for firearms. This regulatory regime is directed 
generally at public safety. Parliament’s belief was, no doubt, that an 
effective system of regulation would reduce the incidence of offences 
committed with firearms, ranging from murder and manslaughter to 
pointing a firearm without lawful excuse (section 87) to careless use of a 
firearm (section 86(1)). These are core wrongs and harms that are 
sufficiently dangerous to be justly criminalized under any view of the 
proper scope of criminal law. But consider offences such as contravening 
a firearms regulation (section 86(2)), unauthorized possession of a 
firearm (section 92), or possession of a firearm in an unauthorized place 
(section 93). None of the conduct prohibited by these offences creates 
any risk beyond whatever risk is already inherent in possessing a firearm 
(which is not an offence in itself). None of them is an attempt or a 
conspiracy to commit any other offence. None of them makes the 
accused a party to an offence committed by anyone else. So all of them 
would, according to Nadarajah’s disproportionality argument, violate 
section 7 of the Charter. The same would likely be true of many 
provincial regulatory offences intended to enforce various regulatory 
schemes. It is hard to accept that a principle that would jeopardize so 
much of the apparatus of the modern regulatory state could qualify as 
one of the “basic tenets of our legal system”53 or the “shared assumptions 
on which our system of justice is grounded”.54 And even without this 
version of gross disproportionality, the Court would in an appropriate 
case no doubt use the norms against overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality to invalidate an overly intrusive criminal law or other 
state action.55 
                                                                                                             
53  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.). 
54  Canadian Foundation, supra, note 5, at para. 8. 
55  As in PHS, supra, note 31. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that statutory 
interpretation should precede and not be influenced by Charter 
considerations, except where the statute is ambiguous.56 Despite this 
holding, the Court’s approach to the anti-terrorism provisions of the 
Code has been to use statutory interpretation rather than invalidation to 
control the scope of criminal liability and to ensure a fair trial process. In 
Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, the Court read the 
provisions of the Code concerning investigative hearings as generously 
as possible in respect of the rights of the person summoned to answer 
questions;57 similarly, in Ahmad, the Court interpreted certain provisions 
of the Canada Evidence Act in a non-obvious way so as to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.58 Khawaja provides another example of this 
tendency. There is a good argument for interpreting the actus reus of 
section 83.18 of the Criminal Code quite broadly, but the Court reads the 
legislative purposes of the anti-terrorism provisions as already including 
a concern about over-criminalization;59 this reading supports a narrow 
interpretation of both the mens rea and the actus reus, and so enables the 
Court to reject the claim that the offence is overbroad. The Court’s 
rejection of the gross disproportionality claim illustrates a rather different 
theme: the Court’s reluctance to recognize new principles of fundamental 
justice. Although the claim was put in terms of gross disproportionality, a 
principle of fundamental justice that has been recognized at least since 
Malmo-Levine, the claim in substance was that a legislature could not 
create an offence that was remoter from the harm it sought to control 
than traditional forms of inchoate and accessorial liability such as 
attempting, conspiring and aiding. While the Court was right to reject the 
claim that this was a constitutional principle, the larger message may be 
that the project of recognizing substantive norms of fundamental justice 
has reached its limit. 
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